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More than a year following the election that delivered Donald Trump a decisive comeback victory, the Democratic Party has yet to released its election autopsy. But, recently, an influential liberal advocacy organization published its own. The Harris campaign, its writers contended, did not resonate with key voter blocs because it failed to concentrate enough on tackling basic economic anxieties. In focusing on the threat to democracy that Trumpist populism represented, liberals overlooked the kitchen-table concerns that were foremost in many people’s minds.

A Lesson for European Capitals

As the EU braces for a turbulent era of politics between now and the end of the decade, that is a lesson that must be fully absorbed in Brussels, Paris and Berlin. The White House, as its newly released national security strategy makes clear, is hopeful that “patriotic” parties in Europe will quickly mirror Mr Trump’s success. Within Europe's Franco-German engine room, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) top the polls, supported by large swaths of working-class voters. But among mainstream leaders and parties, it is difficult to see a strategy that is adequate to challenging times.

Era-Defining Problems and Costly Solutions

The issues Europe faces are costly and era-defining. They encompass the war in Ukraine, maintaining the momentum of the green transition, dealing with demographic change and building economies that are more resilient to pressure by Mr Trump and China. According to a European thinktank, the new age of geopolitical insecurity could necessitate an additional €250bn in yearly EU defence spending. A major study last year on European economic competitiveness called for substantial investment in public goods, to be financed in part by collective EU debt.

Such a economic transformation would stimulate growth figures that have stagnated for years.

However, at both the EU-wide and national levels, there remains a deficit of courage when it comes to generating funds. The EU’s so-called “frugal” nations oppose the idea of collective borrowing, and EU spending plans for the next seven years are profoundly timid. In France, the idea of a tax on the super-rich is widely supported with voters. But the beleaguered centrist government – though desperate to cut its budget deficit – will not consider such a move.

The Cost of Inaction

The truth is that in the absence of such measures, the less well-off will pay the price of fiscal tightening through austerity budgets and increased inequality. Bitter recent conflicts over retirement reforms in both France and Germany testify to a developing struggle over the future of the European social model – a phenomenon that the RN and the AfD have eagerly leveraged to promote a politics of welfare chauvinism. Ms Le Pen’s party, for example, has resisted moves to raise the retirement age and has stated that it would target any benefit cuts at non-French nationals.

Preventing a Strategic Advantage for Nationalists

Across the Atlantic, Mr Trump’s promises to protect working-class interests were deeply disingenuous, as later Medicaid cuts and tax breaks for the wealthy demonstrated. Yet without a convincing progressive counteroffer from the Harris campaign, they proved effective on the election circuit. Without a fundamental change in economic approach, social contracts across the continent risk being torn apart. Governments must avoid handing this electoral boon to the populist movements already on the march in Europe.